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Abstract
Background: We know little about how procurement of a high-risk medical device (HRMD) affects clinical practice
and outcomes. In health systems in high-income countries, and specifically those that maintain a national
arthroplasty registry, procurement decisions are frequently guided by long-term clinical results, with the goal of
ensuring at least standard quality of HRMDs. But in countries like Mexico, decision-making is often dominated by
lowest acquisition price. We set out to study the impact of procurement for orthopaedic HRMDs on clinical
procedures and outcomes.
Methods: We based our qualitative study on 59 in-depth interviews with stakeholders from Mexico, Switzerland,
Germany, and UK: orthopaedic specialists, government officials, other experts, and social security system managers
or administrators. We took a healthcare delivery approach to capturing and comparing factors that affected the
regulations of HRMDs and procurement processes, and to understanding connections between procurement and
clinical practice.
Results: Our findings demonstrate for procurement processes that the three European countries compared to
Mexico don’t have similar concerns with regards to their procurement processes. Deficiencies of procurement
regulations and practices identified from representatives in Mexico were almost absent in European countries. We
identified three areas of deficiency: 1) HRMD regulations based on insufficiently robust clinical evidence (mainly
noted by European countries); 2) Follow-up on Health Technology Assessments is inadequate (noted by Mexico)
and methodology not always good enough (noted by European countries); and, 3) Lowest-acquisition price often
guides procurement decisions and thus may not align with needs of clinical procedures (noted by Mexico and
some European countries).
Conclusions: Procurement processes for orthopaedic HRMDs may have an impact on clinical procedures and
outcomes. A favourable approach is one where orthopaedic specialists are parties to the procurement process, and
post-market surveillance data informs decision-making. Actors in the procurement process can improve their impact
on clinical procedures and outcomes by developing specific strategies that better align the needs of
both, procurement and clinical procedures.
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Background
The procurement process supports healthcare delivery [1,
2] and includes activities related to purchasing and man-
aging inputs, such as demand management, selection and
contracting, relationship management, and operational
delivery [3]. Ideally, procurement decisions should be
guided by principles of transparency and money should be
spent efficiently [4]. However, in some procurement sys-
tems, the pressure to contain cost is very high, and clini-
cians have less input into the process than administrators.
We are here concerned with the procurement of high-risk
medical devices (HRMDs), and that some procurement
systems do not take the concerns of all parties into ac-
count, or work to resolve their competing inter-
ests. HRMDs are highly regulated medical devices (class
III medical devices) implanted in patients, such as knee or
hip prostheses used for arthroplasty surgery.
In health systems of high-income countries, specific-
ally those that have a national arthroplasty registry, pro-
curement decisions usually take long-term clinical
results into account. National registries can contribute
to quality assurance by tracking and monitoring the clin-
ical performance of orthopaedic implants [5]. Clinical
performance can be measured with outcome data, like
the length of time certain implants last (implant sur-
vival) [6] and used to define implant survival require-
ments [7]. Low- and middle-income countries may lack
these quality assurance initiatives, and not give the pro-
curement process the attention it deserves [8]. In these
countries, healthcare system actors are urgently con-
cerned with resolving larger healthcare questions, like
universal access to healthcare services, before they turn
their attention to optimization. For example, reorganiz-
ing Mexican procurement processes would improve out-
comes [1] but Mexicos’ resources are mainly dedicated
to meeting other goals, including universal coverage [9].
There is a dearth of knowledge about the processes
health service providers have devised for procurement
[10–12]. Papers that discuss procurement are usually
concerned with evaluation measures [13], including fi-
nancial measures like cost and time [12]. Extra-financial
measures can also be used to flag weaknesses in the pro-
curement process [14]. These measures can capture
aspects of the procurement process that financial measures
cannot [15]. A paper from the United Kingdom reflected
on the history of procurement processes of the health sec-
tor, and offered a conceptual framework for clinicians and
managers to help them better understand their role in pro-
curement and to improve procurement practices and
outcomes [4]. A study on Mexico described the asso-
ciation between procurement practices and the risk of
sub-standard medical products received [1, 10], but
there were no follow-up studies providing insight into
this association.
Purpose
We set out to study the impact of procurement on
clinical practice and outcomes for orthopaedic
HRMDs. We took a healthcare delivery perspective in
our effort to determine (i) how the set-up of HRMD
regulations exerts influence on procurement (macro
level), (ii) how procurement regulations and practices
align with expectations of clinical practice (meso
level) and, (iii) how procurement practices affect clin-
ical practice and outcome (micro). We adapted the
healthcare delivery model (HCDM) [16] and the sup-
ply link framework [13] so our research approach
model captured the factors that influence procure-
ment regulations and practices for orthopaedic
HRMDs (Fig. 1).
We focused on three healthcare delivery levels: 1)
macro (regulatory, normative, managing); 2) meso
(care provider facility); and, 3) micro (healthcare pro-
fessional and patient). We emphasised procurement
based on the supply link framework and installed it
between the meso and micro levels. Procurement has
three main actors: supplier; procurement administra-
tion (purchaser); and, meso level (internal customer)
and micro level (user). The interaction between the
main actors is defined by (i) procurement administra-
tion and internal customer or user, and (ii) procure-
ment administration and supplier. We also defined
themes related to procurement: (i) regulations (pre-
and post-market), (ii) eligibility, (iii) procurement, and
(iv) clinical procedure.
Methods
Setting
To better understand the impact of procurement on
clinical procedures and outcomes, we compared the
context and set-up of procurement for orthopaedic
HRMDs across four countries: Mexico (upper-middle in-
come country) and United Kingdom, Switzerland and
Germany (high income countries) and conducted in-
depth interviews with healthcare system stakeholders.
We interviewed (i) stakeholders who represented macro
and meso levels, and supplier (Group 1, 2, and 4) to
understand how health technology regulations influence
procurement, and (ii) orthopaedic specialists who repre-
sent the micro level (Group 3) to capture obstacles to
the interplay between procurement regulations and prac-
tices, the interests of parties involved directly or indir-
ectly in procurement, and clinical procedures and
outcomes.
Rationale and validity of selected research method
We chose this approach because a quantitative approach
would not have given us enough data to answer our sen-
sitive and complex research question, and because there
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were so few prospective participants representing the
macro level and low-to-moderate number of prospective
participants representing the meso level.
To ensure validity and reliability we used the following
strategies: (i) during interviews we probed deeply to un-
cover attitudes, open up new dimensions of a problem,
and to urge the stakeholder to describe their personal
stake in the process, (ii) we triangulated data by defining
four groups of stakeholders per study country, and (iii)
we used different interview guides (described in “data
collection”) that we pre-tested with few stakeholders
from the study countries.
Study country selection
We wanted to compare the context and set-up of pro-
curement in Mexico in relation to countries that met the
following inclusion criteria: 1) No centrally organized
procurement process mandated for the whole healthcare
system; 2) Health care system had a DRG payment
mechanism to reimburse for HRMD; 3) Country had a
National Arthroplasty Registry for HRMDs (established
or in progress); and, 4) Discussion about the clinical bur-
den of high-risk HRMDs was ongoing in that country.
We selected The United Kingdom, Switzerland and
Germany from a list of countries that met these criteria
and on purposive criteria.
Study population and recruitment
We interviewed 59 people. Of these, 26 (44 %) were
government officials or experts who focused on health
technology regulations, health technology assessment,
eligibility, medical device quality, research, or medical
training (Group 1 represented the macro level); 6
(10 %) were employed by a social security institution
or ministry of health (Group 2 represented the meso
level); 15 (26 %) were orthopaedic specialists (Group
3 represented the micro level); and, 12 (20 %) were
employed by medical product suppliers (Group 4 rep-
resented the supplier level). Table 1 shows the com-
position of participants by stakeholder country.
We identified and recruited participants for interviews:
(i) by searching each countrys’ listings from the ministry
of health and industry for orthopaedic HRMDs, national
academic expert, orthopaedic key opinion leaders, organi-
sations, hospitals, and institutions; and (ii) we asked inter-
viewees to recommend other national or international
experts in our area of interest. We focused on generating
sufficient and useful material to reflect a variety of opin-
ions and experience, and achieving saturation for general
themes. We based the sample we selected for each coun-
try on three criteria: 1) it should include at least one stake-
holder for each group; (ii) stakeholders from each group
should be distributed evenly across study countries; and,
(iii) each country group provided its experience and opin-
ions on each of the four themes (regulations, eligibility,
procurement, and clinical procedures and outcomes).
We approached prospective interviewees between June
and September 2014, contacting them by email or phone
to introduce them to our study rationale and research.
Before we invited them to an interview, the principal in-
vestigator talked or wrote to them.
Data collection
Interviews averaged 24 min (min = 17 min, max =
45 min) and were conducted in the language of the par-
ticipant (English, Spanish or German). We used a file
naming system and anonymised interviewees by generat-
ing a list of archival numbers. The principal investigator
interviewed all participants. Of the 59 interviews we
conducted, 44 (74 %) were face-to-face and 14 (24 %)
were phone interviews; only one (2 %) interviewee sub-
mitted a written answer because his employer required
Macro (Group 1)
Regulatory, normative, managing
Meso (Group 2) 
Care provider facilities 
Micro (Group 3) 
Healthcare professional & patient 
Supplier (Group 4)
Procurement of high-risk 
medical devices 
Clinical practice and outcome 
using high-risk medical devices 
Eligibility of high-risk 
medical devices 
Regulations of high-
risk medical devices 
Fig. 1 Theoretical conceptual framework
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it. We audio recorded 53 (90 %) interviews and tran-
scribed them with F5 software [17]. The transcrip-
tions of the interviews that we did not record were
based on an interview protocol. The principal investi-
gator and one assistant transcribed the interviews,
and the principal investigator reviewed them again.
The interviewer used semi-structured interview guides
(Table 2) to explore stakeholder experiences and so-
licit their opinions on health technology regulation
and eligibility, its effect on procurement, and the role
of programmes that target quality and support pro-
curement (Group 1, 2, 4), and the influence of pro-
curement regulations and practices on clinical
procedures and outcomes (Group 3).
Data analysis
We iteratively analysed the content of all interviews in
MAXQDA software [18] and systematically inferred
interdependencies between the experiences and opinions
of stakeholders. First, we closely read each transcript
(data orientation) during initial coding. Second, we se-
lected statements that addressed frequently mentioned
themes and fact-based arguments (data reduction).
Third, we revised our list of themes, improved codes if
necessary, and clarified ambiguous statements (data dis-
play). Fourth, we drew on the themes we identified as
deficiencies in the understanding of the impact of pro-
curement and factors influencing procurement (conclu-
sion drawing). The main researcher analysed all data.
Results
We divided our findings into three perspectives: macro;
meso; micro. Table 3 contains a selection of relevant
quotes.
Macro level: How does the set-up of HRMD regulations
exert influence on procurement?
We asked interviewees from all countries to share their
experience and opinions about the role played by HRMD
regulations (e.g., market approval, Health Technology
Table 1 Composition of participants
Stakeholder group Mexico Switzer-land Germany UK Other Total
Group 1 (macro level) 9 (38 %) 7 (50 %) 5 (50 %) 4 (40 %) 1 (100 %)a 26 (44 %)
Regulations 2 (22 %) 2 (29 %) 1 (20 %) - - 7 (27 %)
Eligibility 2 (22 %) 2 (29 %) 2 (40 %) - - 7 (27 %)
International expert 2 (22 %) -a -a -a 1 (100 %)a 3 (11 %)
Quality assurance 3 (34 %) 3 (42 %) 2 (40 %) - - 9 (35 %)
Group 2 (meso level) 3 (12 %) 1 (8 %) 1 (10 %) 1 (10 %) - 6 (10 %)
Group 3 (micro level) 8 (33 %) 3 (21 %) 2 (20 %) 2 (20 %) - 15 (26 %)
Group 4 (supplier) 4 (17 %) 3 (21 %) 2 (20 %) 2 (20 %) - 12 (20 %)
Total per country 24 (41 %) 14 (24 %) 10 (17 %) 10 (17 %) 1 (1 %)a 59 (100 %)
a As an international expert for the three European countries under review we selected one stakeholder that is listed in column “Other”
Table 2 Extraction of interview guide questions
Q1 What do you think induces healthcare professionals to claim that the clinical practice is sometimes affected adversely when the medical device
(clarify that this question does not address the device technology but the brand) is selected by a purchasing or procurement department rather
than by the physician itself?
Q2 What do you think are core aspects for the provision of medical device quality? The term “medical device quality” refers to a medical device that
demonstrates the successful use intra-operatively (no failures of implant, instrument or surgical technique) and post-operatively (average to high
implant survival rate based on clinical data). The term “provision” covers all aspects that contribute to the decision process of the purchasing or
procurement department.
Q3 Evaluating the performance of a procurement process, generally generic measures (costs, time, etc.) are considered. The literature appeals that
the performance of a procurement process within the health system has to be based on non financial measures too; this permits also to
evaluate how the procurement process is embedded in its environment. Non financial measures cover i.e., information flow, failure reporting,
quality monitoring, etc. What do you think are important non financial measures that contribute to the successful “provision” of “medical device
quality”?
Q4 As a follow up of Q3: From the perspective of a HCP, what do you think are additional and desirable non financial measures that contribute to
the successful provision of “medical device quality”?
Q5 The procurement function generally implements a quality assurance system to guarantee good practices and outcomes of a procurement
process. What do you think such a system should incorporate to provide medical device quality (consultation of clinical studies, arthroplasty
registers, HTAs, internal reports on implant use, etc.)?
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Table 3 Extraction of original statements
Themes Illustrative quotations Interviewee
Macro level: How does the set-up of medical device regulations exert influence on procurement
Regulation for
medical devices
“[W]ho gives us the mayor quality guarantee is Cofepris…” Mexico (O.1._201409251747_MEX)
“[B]ecause we had to make the experience that the regime of
medical devices … in comparison to the regime of
pharmaceuticals is frequently criticized due to its putative
rather liberal market access requirements.”
Switzerland (O.1._201409020858_ZRH)
“[F]or all other products especially medical devices that are
classified as high-risk products there are requirements that
these have to work. How this is measured is not clearly described.”
Germany (O.1._201410291400_TUT)
“[E]ach car that is being validated hast four wheels and confirm
with a specific quality norm and for medical devices it is the same”
Germany (O.1._201406260812_ZRH)
“[I]ndeed we have a discussion that we could say that since
ever there have been sometime problems also with hip implants
and other implants. But this is almost not possible to avoid
because for technical innovations you obtain a better
understanding based on practical experiences…”
Germany (O.1._201409020858_ZRH)
Eligibility for
medical devices
“…[t]he standard list is based on evidence that is already 6
to 10 years old, obsolete, and it will be used for additional 6 years.”
Mexico (O.1._201410031215_MEX)
“…[b]ut what exists already which has years, our work will
be to update and to classify or segment.”
Mexico (O.1._201410311530_ZRH)
“[I]t doesn’t imply any problem, no, because the standard
list contains good products.”
Mexico (O.1._201409251747_MEX)
“[M]edical devices have relatively immature HTA methodologies
that frequently fail to address the lower levels of evidence
associated with medical devices…”
United Kingdom (O.1._201409181100_ZRH)
“[C]urrently it seems that in the ministry of health there
will be more focus on new responsibilities with a focus on HTA.”
Switzerland (O.1._201408211231_ZRH)
Meso level: How are procurement practices and regulations aligned with expectations of clinical practice
Procurement regulations
and practices
“…[i]t is very economic driven and what is cheaper is what will
be purchased.”
Mexico (O.1._201409251542_MEX)
“[T]he provider of service packages has a free ticket to select the
medical device that he will provide to the hospital.”
Mexico (O.1._201409180852_MEX)
“[T]here have been problems like always and we try to prevent
this with a new tender.”
Mexico (O.1._201409251542_MEX)
“[I]f we are lucky in procurement there are administrators that
have experience and know what they are procuring. But normally
this is not the case and they base their documentation on the
standard list that isn’t always updated and that is very generic
and in consequence we are purchasing sub-standard quality.”
Mexico (O.1._201410311530_ZRH)
“…[i]t is not the best quality because the standard list is very
obsolete and not updated and there are no specific guides
to make an evaluation.”
Mexico (O.1._201409191334_MEX)
“…[t]he administrator now use providers for service packages …
but the quality is not guaranteed because these providers don’t
have to provide what has been included in the standard list
and they can provide what they want.”
Mexico (O.1._201409191334_MEX)
“[S]o what I am trying to say is that it is not just the cost
you need, you need have really good health economist data
to support your products really well, and to also calculate the
actual full treatment cost including the health benefits and the
cost of the revision or failure or lack of performance …“
United Kingdom (O.1._201407211627_YRK)
“…[w]e are under huge fiancial pressures to trying to save
money and we will save on certain, any reasonable thing we
can but you cannot compromise the quality on patients
safety and outcomes.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201407221144_BOL)
“[T]he expectation was that hip joint should have a survival
ship of 90 % at 10 years at post market.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408011100_LUZ)
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Table 3 Extraction of original statements (Continued)
“…[a] new product and the clinical data isn't gonna be there
and how do you fight against that. And that is when you
need that senior engagement where you end up … And
quality is there, finance is there, they than gonna said to
me "but how does it interact in the patient?”
United Kingdom (O.1._201407221144_BOL)
“[I] think what we do is continuing to mature and it gets
better each year.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408011100_LUZ)
“[S]o HTA they are useful but they are not anything like
what is a clinical outcome.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408241352_LUZ)
“[W]ell there are hospitals where the price takes over
priority so that the surgeon just has to accept what
he get provided.”
Germany (O.1._201408061342_DOR)
Programmes targeting
quality and supporting
procurement
“…[i]n Mexico we are missing something such as a
department that monitors clinical practice…”
Mexico (O.1._201410070910_MEX)
“…[w]e have different social security systems and in
consequence the secretary of health doesn’t have full
regulatory control.”
Mexico (O.1. _201410061100_MEX)
“…[t]here is no culture of quality assurance even we
have good structures … but when you go to a health
centre you find disinformation, …, no continuous
information, no one monitoring clinical practice…”
Mexico (O.1._201410061100_MEX)
“…[o]r we do have two systems doing the same and
in some way they are competing and this causes confusion.”
Mexico (O.1._201410061100_MEX)
“…[u]nfortunately we cannot make a patient monitoring
of more that 2 to 3 years because of the system.”
Mexico (O.1._201409251747_MEX)
“…[w]e have indicator that doesn’t represent quality
assurance but it is somehow a constant monitoring of
the quality by means of the indicator that we are using.”
Mexico (O.1._201411191930_ZRH)
“[I]n my opinion a registry is a good basis for decision-making…” Switzerland (O.1._201408121000_BAA)
” [P]rimarily we are interested in the outcome quality.” Switzerland (O.1._201407291401_ZRH)
“…[t]o make sure, that surgeon use evidence based, to
decide on their prosthesis.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201407231054_LON)
“…[t]he implant registry for us in joint replacements, is our
key source of information with the devices. The spontaneous
reporting with incidence … gives you incomplete numerators
and you don’t now the nominators. If I am producing
registry data … real time survival ship data, performances,
mix of devices and than some decisions in terms of sizes,
materials used, etc. So it is a very powerful tool for getting
indicators on post market performance.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408011100_LUZ)
“…[t]hey will be able to tell how long the implant has been
available and what level of evidence there is to support its use …”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408072230_ZRH)
“…[c]lass II and III devices have a safety-profile, but this does
not include evidence of clinical efficacy.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201409181100_ZRH)
“[S]o the ODEP system would set up on the basis of guidance
given by NICE … The expectation was that hip joint should
have a survival ship of 90 percent at 10 years at post
market … than they gave indications of how well the
performance was of those devices well against set NICE criteria
at a 10 year mark.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408011100_LUZ)
“[W]ell, the surgeon can’t use the Beyond Compliance implants
unless they have been specifically trained and is agreed by the
manufacturer and the champions surgeons. Beyond
Compliance are being used by a limited number of people.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408072230_ZRH)
“…[wi]mplant registries, which company devices, and that from
all perspectives is a key item for gaining continuous information
about the involving, safety profile…”
United Kingdom (O.1._201408011100_LUZ)
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Assessments [HTA], eligibility of HRMD, etc.). Opinions
of representatives from European countries and stake-
holders of Group 3 and Group 4 from Mexico agreed that
it was important to update requirements in the regula-
tions for HRMDs.
Regulations for HRMDs
Health technology regulations focus primarily on as-
suring standards of clinical safety, performance, and
efficacy of HRMDs [19]. However, this does not pre-
vent sub-standard clinical results in the short- or
Table 3 Extraction of original statements (Continued)
“[J]ust think in the patient. When you are facing the problem of
an artificial cardiac valve and you get informed by the health
professional that they don’t have information about the clinical
value but that they can assure you that it doesn’t cause any
electric shock and doesn’t oxidize…”
Germany (O.1._201408201611_KOL)
Micro level: How may procurement practices influence clinical practice and outcome
Cost-related factors “[W]e are drawing attention to the economic aspects but not
to what the surgeon needs…”
Mexico (O.1._201410031215_MEX)
“…[t]he aspect is fundamental economically; that what is
cheaper is that what will be purchased.”
Mexico (O.1._201409251542_MEX)
“[U]nfortunately in our country what we do is that we don’t
focus on the best quality but on the best price. In consequence
this impairs the delivery of quality of care, but this is only one aspect …”
Mexico (O.1._201409171712_MEX)
“[N]ow, the person who is just buying hips is not thinking
about the added value to the hospital. That is why the
procurement people got to think on value and they need to
understand all the elements that could make up that value.
Otherwise they make own purchasing decisions.”
United Kingdom (O.1._201407210956_LEE)
“[W]ell, there are hospitals where price dominates everything…” Germany (O.1._201408061342_DOR)
“…[I] did experience in one healthcare facility that they
switched from one cicatrice material to another because of a
lower price … we observed more wound problems than before.”
Germany (O.1._201408061342_DOR)
Knowledge-related factors “[T]he surgeons’ opinion is important to determine the services
he is going to have and to calculate required quantities.”
Mexico (O.1._201410081050_MEX)
“[b]ecause the procurement staff is deciding we don’t always
receive what we need or what the patient requires.”
Mexico (O.1._201409191220_MEX)
“…[w]e as surgeon do not always agree with a provided
product. Based on our experience and knowledge we believe
in other products of higher quality and superior performance…”
Mexico (O.1._201409251747_MEX)
“[T]he surgeon is asked to work with what he has.” Mexico (O.1._201409251747_MEX)
“The decision if we use a new implant system is always done
by the user and the user is the surgeon”
Germany (O.1._201408051326_FRA)
“[I] had the impression that the surgeons weren’t very satisfied
when they were not involved in decision-making.”
Germany (O.1._201406260812_ZRH)
“…[t]he expertise of the surgeon is very crucial. He is
responsible for what the patient gets implanted and therefore he
needs to be convinced of what he is using during surgery.”
Switzerland (O.1._201408121000_BAA)
“[I]n Switzerland much is in the responsibility of the surgeons
and the hospitals”
Switzerland (O.1._201409081044_BER)
“… [i]n the end it is up to 90 % the surgeon.” Switzerland (O.1._201407101428_LUZ)
Clinical evidence related factors (please consult quotations for programmes targeting quality
and supporting procurement)
Procurement framework
related factors
“[I]n some situations what we have seen is that they use an
inadequate implant size … but there haven’t provided
another implant…”
Mexico (O.1._201410091420_MEX)
“…[t]hey start the surgery and when they are gonna to use the
implant system they realize that it is incomplete …”
Mexico (O.1._201409171712_MEX)
“[E]ach surgeon no matter how experienced he is needs to be
trained on a new implant … each patient that is suffering
damages due to wrong is not acceptable.”
Switzerland (O.1._201408121000_BAA)
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long-term. The requirements for HRMDs include
proofs of quality like risk assessments and laboratory
analysis based on ISO norms [20] that are important
to ensure material safety. However, if HRMDs need
to meet no other criteria for judging long-term clin-
ical safety (standards for implant survival), the quality
of the clinical procedure and outcome may be
compromised.
In general, interviewees from all countries pointed out
the differences between stringent requirements for
pharmaceutical products, and less strict requirements
for HRMDs. Most of interviewees in Groups 3 and 4
shared this view. Representatives from Mexico who had
little or no concern about current health regulations ex-
plained that current regulations mostly focus on HRMDs
that have already been approved in the United States or
in a European country.
The main concern the representatives of European
countries shared is that HRMD regulations used in-
sufficient robust clinical evidence. They were con-
cerned that market approval of orthopaedic HRMDs
were poorly regulated because they were generally de-
signed to ensure clinical safety such as material con-
formity checks based on ISO norms. But this
approach does not focus on long-term clinical safety.
Some European representatives wanted to see clinical
trials, or at least prospective studies, to become a
mandatory part of the health regulation process for
HRMDs.
Regulations for the eligibility of HRMDs
Recently, HTAs for HRMDs have been criticized as not
being based on sufficiently available clinical evidence
[19]. Our study findings emphasize that HTAs were
often not followed up or updated (Mexico), or not fully
applied using inadequate methodology (mainly European
countries). The role played by HTA results [21] differs
between countries and how HTA results influence
decision-making.
In Mexico, an inter-institutional committee under
the Secretariat of Health, uses HTA findings to decide
which technologies are eligible for purchase (national
standard list). This list guides strongly procurement
decisions in the public sector in a way so that differ-
ences between similar medical devices are insuffi-
ciently taken into consideration. Different public
social security systems may tailor the standard list to
their needs. Most interviewees from Mexico thought
of the standard list as a kind of quality seal for
HRMDs. However, some Mexican representatives said
that HTAs did not always meet the highest standards be-
cause they had methodological weaknesses. These respon-
dents thought the standard list as in need of being
updated to eliminate out-dated technologies and correct
wrong or very generic descriptions of MD technologies
(e.g., according to material specification).
Representatives from European countries did not
see the same problems. Both the UK and Germany
commonly conduct HTAs and use their findings to
decisions about reimbursement lists only. But
representatives from the UK, Switzerland and
Germany also questioned the significance of HTA
findings and questioned whether HTA methodology
was adequate for HRMDs. In Switzerland, HTAs
receive less attention but inform decisions about
reimbursement lists.
Meso level: How do procurement regulations and
practices align with expectations of clinical procedures
We asked interviewees from all countries to share their
experiences and opinions about the forces that shape the
interplay between actors in procurement. Stakeholder
groups from European countries made similar statements;
representatives from Mexico had different opinions and
experiences.
Procurement processes regulations
Hospital providers have different avenues to consolidate
purchase power. The largest concern was about to closely
align procurement to clinical procedures, so that it met,
for example, the clinical requirements and needs of ortho-
paedic specialists. Regulations that emerged from a stan-
dardized procurement process system were associated
with sub-standard delivery of healthcare due to inefficient
alignment of procurement and clinical procedure.
In Mexico, it is common to regroup purchase demand
at regional and sometimes national level and per social
security institution or ministry of health so as to in-
crease purchase power. This is why procurement pro-
cesses in Mexico are bureaucratic and highly
standardized. The Mexican law offers two options for
evaluating offers of HRMDs that are listed in the stand-
ard list: 1) Percentage and points or cost-benefit to
choose the highest scored HRMD, and 2) using the
Binario evaluation to choose the cheapest medical device
among those that meet HRMD requirements. Most rep-
resentatives from Mexico were satisfied with the tender
system, but did not always agree with the way offers
were evaluated. They were concerned about the negative
effect it might exert on clinical procedures.
European hospital providers use different ways to con-
solidate their purchasing demand. In Germany, a hos-
pital belongs to a purchasing syndicate, or negotiates
independently with suppliers. Some Europeans empha-
sized that a buying syndicate can exert adverse influence
(provide HRMD that does not satisfy clinicians needs).
In the UK, many trusts or hospitals use the services of, for
example, organizations like the “NHS supply chain”, which
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negotiate prices for their members. In Switzerland, pro-
curement is almost entirely left to hospitals and clinicians.
Buying syndicates are rare in Switzerland and interviewees
mostly seemed to like their independent system. In Euro-
pean countries, most orthopaedic HRMDs are reimbursed
through DRG-based payment systems, which cover ex-
penditures of hospital providers. All European stake-
holders agreed that when DRG systems were
introduced, it pressured them to lower costs but it
was not associated with a general decline in quality.
For example, in the UK, procurers must balance cost
expectations against quality of the required HRMD.
Programmes targeting quality and supporting procurement
We identified a variety of programmes designed to
prevent purchase of sub-standard orthopaedic
HRMDs. Some of these fill gaps in HRMD pre-
market regulations, since approval is often based on
insufficiently robust clinical evidence [22]. These
programmes were initiated and are operated by the
ministry of health, orthopaedic associations, or ortho-
paedic specialist groups. Representatives from
European countries were convinced of the importance
of these programmes that, for instance, using implant
survival data from a national arthroplasty registry to
inform decision-making. But representatives from
Mexico, which has no similar programmes, had a
different opinion.
In Mexico these types of program don’t exist. Stake-
holders mentioned one regional pilot project in Mexico
that had been initiated by an association of orthopaedic
specialists in collaboration with a pharmaceutical com-
pany. The program was intended to make orthopaedic
clinical practice in Mexico more transparent by defining
methods for collecting and analysing clinical data. Groups
3 and 4 underlined the need for quality assurance pro-
grammes that support areas of decision-making like pro-
curement processes and clinical procedures, but most
stakeholders were not specifically concerned about this.
Some thought the failure to define and introduce such
programmes was due to (i) missing or recently discovered
interest in integrating clinical evidence into decision-
making and, (ii) a fragmented and segmented health sys-
tem with different social security systems, which made it
hard to ensure all systems equal access to all pertinent
clinical evidence.
In the European countries, stakeholders were clear
about the importance of clinical evidence for HRMDs.
In the UK, these programmes or initiatives focus on
quality and support for procurement: the “Orthopaedic
Data Evaluation Panel” [7]; “Beyond Compliance” [23];
and, the national joint registry. The Orthopaedic Data
Evaluation Panel provides a due diligence on ortho-
paedic HRMDs. Beyond Compliance offers to clinical
supervise new HRMDs before they are widely used, and
where clinical evidence is not yet robust. In Germany,
EndoCert and the German arthroplasty registry are used
to improve clinical procedures. EndoCert certifies cen-
tres of arthroplasty based on minimum quality standards
and defines requirements: a minimum of 100 arthroplas-
tic hip or knee surgeries per year, at least two main sur-
geons at the hospital facility, and at least one of these
surgeons is specialized in orthopaedic surgery [24]. In
Switzerland, we identified only the Swiss implant registry
that is embedded in the national association for quality
development [25]. Most of the European stakeholders
thought that registries support decision-making and im-
prove quality in clinical practice.
Micro level: How procurement practices can influence
clinical practice and outcome
We identified several themes in the transcripts that de-
scribed factors in the procurement process that influence
clinical procedures and outcomes. These were primarily
identified by Mexican stakeholders and include factors re-
lated to (i) cost; (ii) knowledge; (iii) clinical evidence, and
(iv) the setting for procurement. The themes found in
transcripts by European stakeholders were rare and not
the same as the themes in the transcripts of Mexican
stakeholders.
Factors related to cost: importance of lowest acquisition price
In Mexico, price is often the ultimate criteria in the selec-
tion and contracting phase of procurement. Many of the
Mexican stakeholders thought this detrimental to the cli-
nicians’ clinical procedures and outcomes. For them, this
focus on buying at the lowest price was the root of the
problem. Some Mexican stakeholders said that clinical
evidence was often unavailable and thus could not factor
into procurement.
In the UK, Switzerland and Germany, interviewees did
not think price was paramount in decision-making,
though many interviewees said that when their DRG sys-
tem was introduced, pressure to cut costs influenced
procurement practices. They did not, however, see this
as a negative. For example, cost-benefit analysis is useful
for choosing between competing HRMDs with similar
characteristics, but which may have different clinical
long-term effects. Some interviewees from Germany ex-
plained that price could take priority over important
clinical factors for one specific buying syndicate. But
European interviewees commonly saw clinical evidence
data as relevant and necessary to inform procurement.
Factors related to knowledge: lack of orthopaedic specialist
on decision-making committees
Most of the interviewees from European countries, and
most from group Groups 3 and 4 from Mexico, provided
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examples for the importance of the orthopaedic special-
ist to decision-making on HRMDs. But the role of the
orthopaedic specialist in decision-making of a HRMD
was different in the European countries under review
and Mexico.
Many representatives from Mexico said that ortho-
paedic specialists were not very involved in decision-
making, and that this was typical for the public hospital
they worked for. This was generally true for Mexican
stakeholders from Groups 3 and 4, and was partially true
of some stakeholders in Groups 1 and 2. This was men-
tioned for all hospital providers of the social security in-
stitutions and Ministry of Health hospitals or institutes.
Two exceptions for care providers of the Ministry of
Health were the National Institute of Rehabilitation and
the National Institute of Nutrition.
Representatives from European countries said that
orthopaedic specialists are typically closely involved in
most instances. For instance, they emphasized that sur-
gical expertise is essential to determine if switching from
one HRMD to another, and that a cheap HRMD could
have disadvantages for clinical procedures or outcome.
Factors related to clinical evidence: rigid evaluation criteria
do not sufficiently differentiate between similar orthopaedic
HRMDs
Long-term clinical results of similar HRMDs are import-
ant and should be always considered during decision-
making, but countries used this data differently for pro-
curement. Representatives from European countries ar-
gued that only an expert in orthopaedics could evaluate
long-term clinical results and decide what implications
they had for similar HRMDs.
Most representatives from Mexico said market ap-
proval and HTA findings often determined decisions on
similar HRMDs, rather than basing decisions on long-
term clinical effects. They said most Mexican social se-
curity institutions assign procurement administrators
and decision-making boards to make those decisions
and these focus on conformity to material specifica-
tions and cost-benefit aspects; however, these boards did
not consequently include orthopaedic experts.
Factors related to the procurement setting: procurement
framework can influence quality of service received
Short-term tenders that procure large quantities of
HRMDs are very common in Mexico, but not in European
countries. In Mexico, stakeholders from Groups 3 and 4
but also few stakeholders from Group 1, reported that
short-term tenders affect clinical practice. We isolated
three themes: (i) the available selection of implants for
treating different types of patients may be limited; (ii) sets
of implant and instruments may be incomplete, and (iii)
there is a learning curve for orthopaedic specialists for
each new HRMD system. Representatives from Mexico
said they sometimes need to treat patients with sub-
optimal implants, or that they didn’t have the right
HRMD sizes or instruments. Only few representatives
thought the learning curve was an obstacle to their clinical
practice. They liked being exposed to different HRMDs,
but regretted that they were unable to gain long-term clin-
ical experience on a specific HRMD.
Stakeholders from Europe spoke hypothetically on
these themes, but their situation was different from
Mexican stakeholders. They pointed out that short-term
contracts lead to short-term use of an orthopaedic im-
plant, which would make it impossible to gain adequate
experience with a given.
Discussion
We found that in the European countries under review,
there is substantial attention being given to regulations,
which provide the market approval and influence the
framework for the procurement of HRMDs. In Mexico,
however, there are rarely similar discussions or concerns
because they have not identified any reason so far to evalu-
ate or update the current pre- and post-market regulations
for HRMDs. Mexico does not have procedures in place to
consequently prevent sub-standard quality of HRMDs and
apply post-market surveillance across all social security in-
stitutions. For instance, increased incidence in European
countries under review of post-operative problems resulting
from the use of metal-on-metal hips, or after breast im-
plants, sparked wide discussion about HRMD regulation.
This heightened the attention to regulations for HRMDs
and has recently spurred the EU to redefine the require-
ments for CE marking (founded on EU safety), health and
environmental protection requirements before a product is
placed on a market. In Mexico, however, in 2016 the inter-
institutional committee responsible for the standard list of
medical devices introduced now a specific catalogue of
technologies related to orthopaedics and traumatology [26].
The committee has identified the need that these medical
devices require specific attention.
Our findings demonstrate for procurement processes
that the three European countries compared to Mexico
don’t have similar concerns with regards to their procure-
ment processes. Deficiencies of procurement regulations
and practices identified from representatives in Mexico
were almost absent in European countries. Table 4 sum-
marizes the relevance of concerns about regulations of
HRMDs and procurement processes, and about factors in-
fluencing procurement for all groups and study countries.
Taken together, our findings for the impact of
procurement on clinical procedures and outcomes
demonstrate that:
1) In Mexico and compared to the three European
countries, price is often more important than other
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criteria such as the effect of different orthopaedic
HRMDs on clinical outcomes. Basing procurement deci-
sions on the Binario option may cause this problem.
Since decisions do not rely on detailed assessments of
HRMDs that consider the effects of variants of similar
orthopaedic HRMDs on clinical practice and outcome,
knowledge of Mexican orthopaedic specialists is insuffi-
ciently integrated into decision-making.
2) Mexicos’ concern is cutting cost and controlling for
corruption. Short-term, high-volume tenders cut costs
and provide transparency that protects against corruption.
The force these tenders exert on clinical procedures may
not leave much room for improvement without adequate
health technology policies. European countries also face
cost pressure, especially since the introduction of DRG
systems, but the long-term focus (clinical results) and pro-
jections of European procurement systems prevent some
of the problems Mexico faces.
3) Mexican orthopaedic specialists are rarely involved
in procurement decision-making, but orthopaedic spe-
cialists do not generally hold against this. It may be that
it is difficult to voice strong critique about inconve-
niences caused by the very rigid centrally organized pro-
curement process system, which is largely disconnected
from clinical practice. In European countries it would be
unthinkable to exclude the orthopaedic specialist from
decision-making, perhaps since professional associations,
are involved in setting standards and exert great deal of
influence in the health system.
This study proves a connectivity between procure-
ment and clinical practice but does not set a stand-
ard; given that the identified aspects are crucial to
the procurement process, future studies analysing
procurement processes are needed before it becomes
apparent what aspects and factors within a health sys-
tem finally determine procurement regulations and
practices.
The limitations and strengths of the study
We believe this is a novel investigation of procurement
processes for HRMDs as it examines the influence these
processes may exert on clinical practice. We identified
specific aspects of procurement practices, using ortho-
paedic HRMDs as our example, and showed how they
influence clinical practice and fail to prevent sub-
standard medical care. We included a range of stake-
holders, but did not include patients or representatives
from rehabilitation centres. Thus, representation of
stakeholders of the micro level is incomplete and we
only considered orthopaedic HRMDs, this limits our
ability to generalize our findings.
Conclusion
Procurement processes for orthopaedic HRMDs may
have an impact on clinical practice and outcomes.
Health technology regulations require continuous im-
provements to prevent sub-standard clinical results in
the short- or long-term. Regulations and practices for
decision-making of procurement for HRMDs may
have a large influence on clinical practice. In all the
health systems we reviewed, there was tension
between cost and quality, and concern about the
interaction between procurement and the user
(orthopaedic specialist). A favourable relationship be-
tween procurement and clinical practice is one where
orthopaedic specialists are parties to the procurement
process, and post market surveillance data informs
Table 4 Relevance of concerns about regulations of HRMDs
and procurement processes, and about factors influencing
procurement
Stakeholder group Mexico Switzerland Germany UK Total
Regulations for market approval
Group 1 - +++ +++ +++ ++(+)
Group 2 - ++ ++ +++ +(+)
Group 3 ++ +++ +++ +++ ++(+)
Group 4 ++ +++ +++ +++ ++(+)
Total + ++(+) ++(+) +++
Regulations for eligibility
Group 1 + ++ +++ +++ ++(+)
Group 2 - +++ ++ ++ +(+)
Group 3 ++ +++ +++ +++ ++(+)
Group 4 ++ ++ +++ +++ ++
Total + ++ ++(+) ++(+)
Procurement regulations and practices
Group 1 ++ - - - (+)
Group 2 - - - - -
Group 3 +++ - + - +
Group 4 +++ - + - +
Total ++ - (+) -
Programmes targeting quality and supporting procurement
Group 1 + - - - (+)
Group 2 + - - - (+)
Group 3 ++ - - - (+)
Group 4 ++ - - - (+)
Total +(+) - - -
Factors influencing procurement
Cost +++ - + - +
Knowledge +++ - + - +
Clinical evidence +++ - - - +
Procurement setting +++ - - - +
Total +++ - (+) -
+++ very relevant ++ moderate relevant + relevant - not relevant
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decision-making. We are not yet sure if cost is the
predominant obstacle in procurement for HRMD in
Mexico, or if other factors, like the way clinical data is
managed, have as great an effect. We found that Mexico
does not assure and monitor long-term effects on the
health of patients implanted with HRMDs.
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